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The usual practice in economics is to treat individual attitude endowments as a black
box. Recent theoretical contributions endogenize these endowments by assuming that
individuals’ attitudes are inﬂuenced by the attitudes of their parents or other role models.
Attitudes transmitted from parents to children may include fundamental preferences, such
as risk or time preference, and also crucial beliefs about the world, for example priors
about the trustworthiness of others. Models sharing the feature of attitude transmission
have been used to shed new light on diverse phenomena including: the persistence of
ethnic di erences in the U.S. (Bisin and Verdier, 2000); increasing female labor force
participation in the U.S., due to the intergenerational transmission of a change in attitudes
towards women and work ﬁrst triggered by World War II (Fern´ andez et al., 2004); the
ascension of the middle class during the British industrial revolution, due to middle-
class parents passing on the value of patience to their children (Doepke and Zilibotti,
2005 and 2008); the persistence of di erent fertility and work practices across cultures
(Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Fern´ andez, 2007b); the impact of policy
changes (regarding corruption), and historical circumstances decades in the past, such as
despotic governments, on current levels of trust and social capital (Hauk and Saez-Marti,
2002; Tabellini, 2005 and 2007).1 These models provide powerful new explanations for
important patterns in economic behaviors and outcomes. The key underlying mechanism
of attitude transmission, however, is not directly observed and has not been investigated
systematically in empirical work.
This paper provides evidence on the underlying process of attitude transmission,
testing for the existence of three distinct channels for attitude transmission highlighted
in the literature. We test for transmission of attitudes from parents to children using
direct measures of attitudes for individuals as well as for their parents. In addition we
test for positive assortative mating of parents, on the basis of attitudes to be transmitted
to the child. This reinforces the impact of parents on the child, because a child who
has one parent with a given attitude is likely to have a second one with that attitude
as well. Assuming that both mothers and fathers matter for child attitudes, positive
assortative mating is an implication of models that assume parents have a preference for
1 See also Ichino and Maggi (2000); Bisin and Verdier (2001); Bisin et al. (2004); Fern´ andez (2007a).
1children with similar attitudes to their own; in this case parents have an incentive to ﬁnd
similar partners, in order to avoid distortions in child attitudes. We also investigate a
third mechanism, in which prevailing attitudes in the local environment inﬂuence child
attitudes, in addition to the attitudes of parents. This channel would tend to reinforce
regional or ethnic di erences. Some models, such as Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin et
al. (2004), incorporate all three mechanisms explicitly, and other models in the literature
typically incorporate one or more.2
Our analysis focuses on validated survey measures of two particularly important
attitudes: willingness to take risks, and willingness to trust other people. The former
captures an important dimension of individual preferences, while the latter is more related
to beliefs, in the context of trustworthiness of others. Transmission of risk attitudes is
important for child behavior because almost every important economic decision involves
uncertainty. Indeed, risk attitudes have been shown empirically to have a large impact
on a wide range of important behaviors and outcomes, including investment in stocks,
educational attainment, wealth, home ownership, and patterns of occupational choice.3
Trust is similarly important, but in the realm of social interactions, determining the way
that an individual approaches other people (Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr et al., 2003; Kosfeld
et al., 2005). Many interactions in life involve vulnerability to defection by others, and
trust determines whether an individual cooperates in these situations, or enters them
at all. The level of trust has also been shown to be heterogeneous across countries and
regions, and to explain di erences in aggregate outcomes such as economic growth, volume
of trade, and institutions.4 By perpetuating trust di erences over time, intergenerational
transmission of trust has important ramiﬁcations at the aggregate level as well.
Our data are drawn from the 2003 and 2004 waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), which included new questions on trust and risk, respectively. Each wave of
the SOEP is representative of the German adult population, and includes approximately
22,000 individuals. We end up with data on 3,751 children for whom we observe the
2 Others have also hypothesized that the intergenerational transmission of attitudes, personality, or other
personal traits explains patterns of behavior and outcomes across generations. See, e.g., Bowles and
Gintis (2002a); Osborne (2005); Heckman and Rubinstein (2001); Heckman et al. (2006).
3 E.g., Barsky et al. (1997); Guiso and Paiella, (2001); Dohmen et al. (2005); Guiso and Paiella, (2005);
Guiso et al. (2006).
4 E.g., Putnam et al. (1993); La Porta et al. (1997); Knack and Keefer (1997); Goldin and Katz (1999);
Glaeser et al. (2002); Zak and Knack (2001); Fershtman and Gneezy (2001); Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002); Bornhorst et al. (2004); Gaechter et al. (2004); Guiso et al. (2005); Falk and Zehnder (2007).
2attitudes of both parents. Thus we also have 3,751 parental couples for studying assortative
mating of parents. For all individuals in the data we know the region of residence, and can
match individuals to an average risk or trust attitude in the region. Notably, the particular
survey measures that we use have been validated previously in large scale ﬁeld experiments
with representative subject pools. These validation studies show that our measure of
risk attitudes predicted behavior in an incentivized lottery experiment measuring risk
preference, and that the trust measures predict trusting behavior in a paid trust game.
These ﬁndings underline the behavioral validity of our measures, addressing an important
concern that arises when using survey questions (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999).
Our results are supportive of the attitude transmission approach, and indicate that
all three mechanisms play a role in shaping risk attitudes and trust. The ﬁrst main result
is that risk and trust attitudes are strongly positively correlated between parents and
children. In other words, parents who are more willing to take risks, or who are more
trusting, raise children with similar traits, consistent with a process of intergenerational
transmission. Notably, both mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes matter for child attitudes,
although for trust the mother is especially important. Interestingly, birth order matters,
with ﬁrst born children being more similar to the parents than later born siblings. These
correlations are essentially unchanged when one controls for similarity across generations
in personal or environmental characteristics. Additional robustness checks show that the
intergenerational correlation is not explained by collaboration on survey answers, similar
scale use, reverse causality from children to parents, or by parents and children living in
the same geographic region. The second main ﬁnding is a strong positive correlation of
attitudes within married couples, for both risk attitudes and trust, consistent with positive
assortative mating. We ﬁnd a similarly large correlation among newly married individuals,
indicating that married partners are similar at the outset rather than becoming gradually
more similar over time. In combination with the ﬁnding that both mothers and fathers
matter for child attitudes, this evidence of positive assortative mating is consistent with
the predictions of attitude transmission models. A third ﬁnding is that child attitudes
are signiﬁcantly related to the prevailing attitude in the region, controlling for parental
attitudes. This is true for both risk attitudes and trust attitudes, and robustness checks
show that the result is not driven by children sorting into regions where attitudes are
3similar to their own. These ﬁndings provide evidence that attitudes in the region play a
part in shaping child attitudes, in addition to the parents.
In summary, this paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the transmis-
sion of economically relevant attitudes, in a way that complements the recent theoretical
shift towards endogenizing attitude endowments. We explicitly consider all three mech-
anisms for attitude transmission that are relevant for the theoretical literature, and use
a battery of attitude measures that are behaviorally valid, and span the important do-
mains of risk and trust. We perform an extensive series of robustness checks, and control
for detailed personal and background characteristics of both individuals and their par-
ents. Considering all three of the mechanisms for attitude transmission in the same data
set, using similar empirical strategies, allows disentangling the e ects and potential in-
teractions of di erent mechanisms. For example, the results show that regional attitudes
matter even after controlling for parental attitudes, and vice versa. Also, we ﬁnd positive
assortative mating in conjunction with evidence that both mothers and fathers matter for
child attitudes, which provides support for a speciﬁc prediction of attitude transmission
models. The main contributions of our ﬁndings are providing an empirical basis for the
assumptions regarding attitude transmission mechanisms in the literature, and shedding
light on the basic question of where economically relevant attitudes come from. In particu-
lar, both the parents and the local environment inﬂuence individuals, through the channel
of shaping economically relevant attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 presents results on the intergenerational correlation, Section 4 investigates as-
sortative mating, and Section 5 explores the inﬂuence of regional attitudes. Section 6
discusses implications and directions for future research.
2 Data Description
The data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative panel
survey of the resident adult population in Germany (for a detailed description, see Wagner
et al., 1993, and Schupp and Wagner, 2002). The initial wave of the survey was conducted
in 1984.5 For this study we focus mainly on the 2003 and 2004 waves, because these
5 The panel was extended to include East Germany in 1990, after reuniﬁcation. For more details on the
SOEP, see www.diw.de/gsoep/.
4include key questions used in our analysis. Each wave includes roughly 22,000 individuals,
from about 12,000 households.
The SOEP conducts a separate in-person interview with each member of a house-
hold over the age of 17, in the family’s home. A substantial fraction of the interviews,
about one quarter, are computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI), but in general the
survey is ﬁlled in on paper forms during an oral interview. Importantly, given that we
are interested in the correlation or lack of correlation in the responses of family members,
interviewers are speciﬁcally instructed to administer the survey individually, and to take
every precaution to ensure that di erent household members answer independently and
are not inﬂuenced by each other’s responses. If for some reason one household member
wants to ﬁll in the paper survey at the same time that the interviewer conducts a personal
interview with another household member, the interviewer has to ensure that these two
survey respondents are in di erent rooms. Although the majority of interviews (roughly
80 percent in both 2003 and 2004) were completed while the interviewer was present in the
household, a small fraction of respondents returned the questionnaire by surface mail, due
to severe di culties in scheduling an appointment with the interviewer. In our analysis,
we verify that the results are robust to excluding these mail-in interviews. As a more
conservative robustness check, we also verify that the results are sustained regardless of
whether children live in the same or separate household from their parents.
The 2004 wave of the SOEP contains a novel battery of questions about the risk
attitudes of individuals. One question asks respondents to indicate their willingness to
take risks on an 11-point scale. The wording of the general risk question, translated from
German, is as follows: “How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale,
where the value 0 means: ‘completely unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means:
‘completely willing to take risks’.”6 The survey also includes ﬁve questions that use the
same wording and 11-point scale as the general risk question, but ask about willingness
to take risks in speciﬁc contexts: car driving, ﬁnancial matters, sports and leisure, career,
and health. A ﬁnal risk measure is provided by a question that poses respondents with
a hypothetical lottery, in which they can choose how much of 100,000 Euros to invest,
and either double or get back only half of their investment, with equal probability. This
6 German versions of all risk questions are available online, at www.diw.de.
5question di ers from the previous risk measures in that it uses a di erent scale, and
includes a di erent context.
In the 2003 wave, the SOEP survey includes three questions about individuals’ trust
attitudes. These are similar to the standard measures of trust used in other surveys, for
example the General Social Survey. Subjects were asked to indicate on a four-point scale
to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statements: 1) In general, one
can trust people. 2) These days you cannot rely on anybody else. 3) When dealing with
strangers it is better to be careful before you trust them. The four answer categories were
labelled: strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, strongly disagree.
Transmission of risk and trust attitudes is important if these attitudes a ect behav-
ior, as is typically assumed in economic theory. The behavioral relevance of the particular
measures of risk attitudes that we use has been shown empirically, in a ﬁeld experiment
with a representative subject pool. Dohmen et al. (2005) conduct a ﬁeld experiment with
450 individuals, sampled from all regions of Germany to be representative of the adult
population (sampling was done with the same method used to construct the full SOEP
sample; see Fowler, 1988). All subjects in the experiment ﬁrst completed a detailed ques-
tionnaire, which included the exact same general risk question asked in the 2004 wave
of the SOEP. Subjects then participated in a lottery experiment involving substantial
monetary stakes.7 The authors ﬁnd that the questionnaire responses to the general risk
question are reliable predictors of actual risk taking behavior in the lottery experiment.
Additional evidence for the importance of risk attitudes comes from using responses
to the risk measures in the 2004 wave of the SOEP to explain risk-taking behavior in
various contexts of life. The impact of risk attitudes is large and economically signiﬁcant.
For example, a one standard deviation increase in willingness to take risks measured by the
question about risk attitudes in ﬁnancial matters is associated with a 35 percent increase
in the probability of holding stocks, relative to the baseline probability in the population.
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in willingness to take risks according to the
general risk question is associated with a 30 percent increase in the probability of being
7 In the experiment, subjects had to decide between a lottery, in which they could either win 300 Euros
with probability 1/2 or receive nothing with probability 1/2, and a series of di erent safe payment
alternatives. The lottery option remained the same across choices, but the alternative safe payment
option was increased in steps of 10 Euros up to a maximum of 190 Euros. Subjects were informed in
advance that one of their choices would be randomly selected for payment, and that one out of seven
participants would actually be paid according to the selected choice.
6self-employed.8 Responses to the general risk question have also been shown to explain
sorting into occupations based on earnings variance (Bonin et al., 2007), and to have a large
impact on the probability of moving residence between geographical regions (Jaeger et al.,
2007). Thus, risk attitudes captured by the survey measure have important implications
for behavior.
Fehr et al. (2003) validate the behavioral relevance of the trust measures we use, in
a ﬁeld experiment with a representative sample of 429 subjects, sampled using the same
procedure as the risk experiment described above. Subjects ﬁrst completed a detailed
questionnaire that contained the same three measures on trust attitudes that were asked
in the 2003 wave of the SOEP. Subjects then played a modiﬁed version of the trust game
developed by Berg et al. (1995), a standard tool for eliciting willingness to trust.9 Fehr et
al. (2003) summarize an individual’s responses to the three survey questions about trust
using factor analysis, and then show that this combined measure is a signiﬁcant predictor
of the amount that a ﬁrst-mover actually sends to the other player, in the inventive
compatible trust game. As discussed in the introduction, similar trust measures to ours
have also been shown in previous studies to play an important role in explaining aggregate
outcomes such as growth, functioning of institutions, and volume of trade.
Since we want to investigate whether and to what extent trust and risk attitudes
are correlated between parents and children, we focus our analysis on respondents whose
parents also answered the same survey questions. In total, we have complete information
on either trust or risk attitudes for 3,751 children and both their parents, i.e., for 11,253
individuals.10 We refer to a 3-person group consisting of two parents and their child as a
parents-child pair in the remainder of the paper.
A noteworthy feature of the data is that they allow the study of children at a wide
8 Detailed results available upon request.
9 In the design, two players, both endowed with 10 Euros, were randomly matched. Player A could then
send any amount between 1 and 10 Euros to player B. The amount that A sent was doubled by the
experimenter so that B received twice the amount that A had sent. B could then send money back to A,
but this was not enforceable. The experimenter doubled any amount sent by B with the result that A
received twice the amount that B had sent. The amount that player A sends in this game is a measure
of trust.
10 For 3,327 children in the 2003 wave, we have complete information on their own answers to the trust
questions and both of their parents’ answers to these questions. We also have complete information
about willingness to take risks for 3,331 children from the 2004 wave, and both their parents. These
samples do not completely coincide because some of the children or their parents that were interviewed
in 2003 did not answer the questions about risk attitudes in the 2004 wave. Likewise, in the 2004 wave
we do not have information on some subjects’ answers to the trust questions in 2003. These are mostly
respondents who were not yet interviewed in 2003.
7variety of ages, rather than just teenage children. This is because the SOEP interviews
adult children living with their parents, but also follows children once they are older and
have moved out of the parents’ home to form a new household. For our sample of 3,751
parents-child pairs, 56.9 percent live in the same household, while 39.6 percent of children
in our sample live in di erent households from both of their parents. Only a small fraction
lives in the same household with only one parent. Half of the children in our sample are
older than 23 years of age, and the oldest child is 54. On average, children in our sample
are 25.3 years old (std. dev. 6.96). Fathers in our sample are on average 54.6 years old
(std. dev. 8.70) and mothers are on average 51.7 years of age (std. dev. 8.3).
Variation in parents’ willingness to take risks and trust is a prerequisite for iden-
tifying an impact of parents’ risk and trust attitudes on children’s attitudes. Figure 1
indicates that there is in fact substantial variation for both mothers and fathers. The
histograms for willingness to take risks (upper panel) report the fraction of fathers and
mothers choosing a given answer on the 11-point scale of the general risk question. The
histograms for trust (lower panel) show the distributions of the parental trust measures.
These are derived from principal component analysis and combine responses to the three
separate measures into a scalar, analogous to the approach taken in Fehr et al. (2003).11
We use these trust measures throughout the paper, and construct the measure for the
child in the same way.
Figure 1 also shows that mothers are less willing to take risks than fathers, in
line with the gender e ect that Dohmen et al. (2005) ﬁnd using the entire sample of
the 2004 wave. Table 1 investigates the impact of other plausibly exogenous individual
characteristics, such as age and height. The results in the table are OLS estimates, where
the dependent variable in each column is an individual’s standardized response to the
general risk question. Throughout the analysis we use standardized versions of the risk and
trust measures, in order to aid comparison of coe cients. Standardization is conducted
11 We obtain an individual’s trust measure by multiplying the standardized answers to the respective trust
questions with the loadings of the questions on the principal component. Principal components analysis
is preferable to factor analysis as we are interested in capturing and using the essential variation of the
responses in regression analysis across parents-child pairs, rather than for detailed analysis of covariance
(see also Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). However, our results are almost identical if we instead use factor
analysis for all regressions. We obtain the principal component without rotation. Analysis of eigenvalues
suggests that only the principal component exhibits an eigenvalue larger than unity. The factor loadings,
which are multiplying the standardized responses to the trust, reliance and caution questions are -0.7968,
0.8187 and 0.6377, respectively, for children, -0.7819, 0.8170, and 0.6619, respectively, for fathers, and
-0.7687, 0.8113, and 0.6132, respectively, for mothers.
8separately for the child, the mother, and the father, for the sample where the child and
both parents all have non-missing attitude responses. The table shows that age and height
a ect risk and trust attitudes, as do religion, and characteristics of the region of youth
in terms of city size. The relevance of these characteristics motivates us to control for
them in our analysis in the next section, where we investigate whether parent and child
attitudes are similar even after controlling for similarity in other characteristics that a ect
attitudes.
3 Intergenerational Correlation in Economic Attitudes
3.1 Risk attitudes
We begin the analysis by assessing whether there is an intergenerational correlation in
willingness to take risks. Initially, we focus on the general risk question, and then we
assess the robustness of the results to using alternative survey measures.
Figure 2 provides a ﬁrst look at the relationship between the general risk attitudes
of parents and children, as it appears in the raw data. The ﬁgure shows children’s average
willingness to take risks, for given willingness to take risks of their mother (upper left
diagram) or their father (upper right diagram). Children’s willingness to take risks is
clearly positively associated with parents’ willingness to take risks. This is illustrated
by the positively-sloped regression lines in the diagrams, which are based on a weighted
regression of children’s willingness to take risks on the respective parent’s willingness to
take risks. The weighting takes into account the frequency of child-parent pairs with
a particular combination of willingness to take risks, i.e., the number of children whose
parent states a particular value on the risk scale.12
In Table 2 we regress children’s standardized answers to the general risk question
on the answers of their respective mothers and fathers. We estimate linear regressions,
where the dependent variable is the child’s general willingness to take risk. The key ex-
planatory variables are standardized risk attitudes of mothers and fathers. All coe cients
are OLS estimates, but the results are robust to using other estimation techniques.13 We
12 Note that there is an outlier for mothers choosing a value of 10 on the risk scale. This outlier has little
impact on the slope of the weighted regression line, however, because there are very few mothers in this
category (see Figure 1, upper left panel).
13 We have alternatively conducted all estimations with interval regression techniques that correct for
9report robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation of the error term across
individuals from the same household.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that on average children report a greater willingness to
take risks as parents’ willingness to take risks increases. Coe cients for the mother and
the father are both highly signiﬁcant, and are of comparable size, indicating that child
attitudes are strongly related to attitudes of both parents.14 The coe cients on parents’
risk attitudes are sizable compared to other important variables. The marginal e ect is
roughly 0.16 for both mothers and fathers, which implies that a one standard deviation
increase in willingness to take risks for both parents is associated with a total increase
of about 0.32 standard deviations for the child. This is equivalent to reducing age by 15
years, and is substantially larger than the impact of gender (see Column (2) of Table 1).
In Column (2) of Table 2 we add exogenous controls – gender, age, and height – which
were found previously to a ect risk attitudes (see Table 1). It is interesting to investigate
whether attitudes are still related once we control for similarity in personal characteristics.
For example, tall parents tend to have tall children, which could potentially explain a
similarity in risk attitudes. Alternatively, if personal characteristics do not explain the
intergenerational correlation, this suggests a more direct relationship between attitudes of
parents and their children, consistent with the transmission process assumed in models of
attitude transmission. Not surprisingly, the results in Column (2) indicate that daughters
are less willing to take risks than sons, and that taller and younger children are more likely
to report that they are willing to take risks. Age and height of the parents do not have
a statistically signiﬁcant e ect on children’s willingness to take risks. More importantly,
the positive relationship between children’s and parents’ willingness to take risks remains
virtually the same as in Column (1), and is similarly signiﬁcant, after controlling for
personal characteristics of parents and the child.
In Column (3) we add a variety of other controls for individual characteristics and
environmental factors that could a ect risk attitudes. These include characteristics of the
censoring of the dependent variable. In this case we ﬁnd virtually identical results, which are available
upon request. We also used a binary measure, indicating willingness to take risks if individuals responded
a value greater than ﬁve on the scale from zero to ten. All results are essentially the same if we use the
binary measure instead of the full scale.
14 The coe cient on a parent’s risk attitudes is approximately 50 percent larger if the other parent’s
attitudes are omitted from the regression. This suggests the presence of positive assortative mating, an
issue discussed in detail in Section 4, and provides an additional motivation for including both parents
in the speciﬁcation for Table 2.
10region where the individual lived during the ﬁrst 15 years of life (big city, city, small town,
countryside, missing), and religion (catholic, protestant, other Christian, other religion,
not a member of any church, missing information on religion), for the child and both
parents, as well as indicators for child ethnicity (nationality on passport, aggregated into
17 categories). The regression also controls for subjective health status of parents and the
child, and an indicator for having lived in the GDR before 1989. We also include ﬁxed
e ects for children’s and parents’ current regions of residence (Raumordnungsregion) which
correspond to county-sized administrative areas.15 Finally, for the child and both parents
we control for household income in 2004, and control for years of schooling as a proxy
for permanent income.16 A caveat is that child income could be endogenous with respect
to risk attitudes, so that interpreting coe cients on child income causally is inadvisable.
Important for the question at hand, however, is the fact that the two coe cients of main
interest, mother’s and father’s willingness to take risks, remain essentially unchanged
relative to previous columns when we add income and the full array of other controls.
Thus, there is a strong and signiﬁcant relationship between children’s and parents’ risk
attitudes, controlling for similarity across generations in a wide range of personal and
environmental factors.
Table 3 explores whether the intergenerational correlation in risk attitudes is robust
to using alternative survey measures. Each column uses a di erent question to measure
risk attitudes for parents and children. The set of controls is the same as those in our
full speciﬁcation, Column (3) of Table 2. To facilitate comparison, in Column (1) we
once again report the coe cients for the general risk question. Columns (2) to (6) report
coe cient estimates using each of the ﬁve context-speciﬁc questions, which ask about will-
15 Germany is divided geographically into 97 such regions, which are deﬁned by the Federal O ce for
Building and Regional Planning and reﬂect an aggregation of administrative districts, something akin
to counties in the U.S., taking into account economic agglomeration and commuting ﬂows. Each region
captures a center of economic activity and its surrounding area, and corresponds to a regional labor
market.
16 In order to avoid dropping of observations due to missing observations, we set all missing observation
to zero and include an indicator for missing schooling information. We also estimated all speciﬁcations
with information on occupational prestige as a proxy for permanent income, instead of education. We
use information on childrens’ and their parents’ occupational prestige in form of the Treiman standard
international occupational prestige score, which takes discrete values from 13 to 78, where higher scores
indicate higher prestige (see Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996 for the methods used to construct the
scale). As shown by Ermisch et al. (2006), this prestige measure exhibits a strong correlation with
permanent income. This approach is useful mainly because it mitigates the problem of missing values
on income and thus keeps the number of observations reasonably high. All results are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar if we use occupational prestige instead of years of schooling as a proxy for
permanent income.
11ingness to take risks in car driving, ﬁnancial matters, sports and leisure, health, and career,
respectively. As is evident from Table 3 the correlation of risk attitudes is signiﬁcant at
the 1-percent level for every context, for both mothers and fathers. Thus the correlation in
risk attitudes is not conﬁned to the general risk question but is also observed for questions
incorporating more speciﬁc contexts. One possibility is that the correlation is observed for
all of the di erent measures because they each measure the same underlying disposition
towards risk. Another possibility is that the di erent measures capture distinct aspects
of risk attitude that vary across contexts, and that there is a distinct intergenerational
correlation for each of these more speciﬁc characteristics. In Section 3.3, as part of addi-
tional robustness checks, we investigate the speciﬁcity of the intergenerational correlation
in more detail.
Column (7) of Table 3 reports results based on the hypothetical lottery question. The
measure di ers from the others in that it uses a cardinal scale with seven response values:
investment amounts of 0, 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, 80,000 and 100,000. It also incorporates a
di erent type of context, and also includes given stakes and probabilities. The dependent
variable is the total amount invested by the child in the lottery, and parents’ attitudes are
indicated by their respective investment choices. There is substantial censoring at zero,
due to the many individuals who choose to invest nothing in the lottery. Thus, in this
case we report coe cients that are marginal e ects, estimated using interval regression
techniques that correct for censoring. The resulting intergenerational correlations are
highly signiﬁcant and positive.17 The results from the lottery measure provide a further
indication that the intergenerational correlation is robust, and show that it does not simply
reﬂect a similar way of answering the type of qualitative, 11-point response scales used
for the other measures. The marginal e ects shown in Column (7) of Table 3 imply that
a parent increasing their investment by 1,000 Euros causes a child to invest roughly an
additional 250 Euros, which is substantial.18
In summary, the results show that the risk attitudes of parents are reﬂected in the
17 We also estimated a Probit model, available upon request, where the dependent variable is equal to 1
if the child invested a positive amount and zero otherwise. Regressors included indicators for positive
investment by mother and father, and the same controls as in Column (7). In this case, the probability
that a child invests increases by 0.16 if the father invests, and 0.11 if the mother invests. Parental
investment is highly statistically signiﬁcant, and quantitatively more important than any other control
in the regression.
18 One Euro was worth approximately 1.2 U.S. dollars on average during the period when interviews were
conducted.
12willingness to take risks of the child, and thus provide evidence for a process of intergen-
erational attitude transmission. Notably, although on average child attitudes are strongly
related to parental attitudes, there is heterogeneity in how close children are to their par-
ents. An interesting topic for future research, which would go in the direction of further
reﬁning models of attitude transmission, is exploring factors that strengthen or weaken
this relationship. In unreported regressions, we have identiﬁed one factor that appears to
play a role, namely birth order. We ﬁnd that the correlation between child’s risk attitudes
and parents’ risk attitudes, purged for the inﬂuence of the exogenous controls included in
Column (3) of Table 2, is signiﬁcantly lower for younger siblings. Ascending in the birth
order by one child reduces the correlation between the residuals for child’s risk attitudes
and mother’s risk attitudes by about 0.03, and the correlation between child’s risk resid-
uals and father’s residuals by about 0.02. Thus, ﬁrstborn children are more similar to
parents in terms of risk attitudes, compared to younger siblings.
3.2 Trust attitudes
We now turn to the analysis of the intergenerational correlation in trust. Since we are
interested in behaviorally valid measures, we collapse agreement with the three statements
into a single component, as was done in the validation study by Fehr et al. (2003).19 In
Section 3.3, however, we also assess the robustness of the results to analyzing agreement
with each statement separately.
Figure 2 plots children’s average values of the trust measure, constructed via prin-
cipal component analysis, for given values of the same trust measure of mothers (lower
left diagram) and fathers (lower right diagram). The regression lines are weighted by the
number of observations of children whose parents’ trust measure takes a particular value.
The upward slopes of the weighted regression lines give an initial indication that children’s
tendency to trust is increasing in their parents’ willingness to trust.
To test the relationship suggested in Figure 2 more rigourously we ran three regres-
sions for trust attitudes analogous to the ones reported for risk in Table 2. The results are
displayed in Table 4. The dependent variable is the (standardized) principal component
(“trust”) of the child, which is regressed on the respective standardized principal com-
ponents of the mother and father, respectively. In the ﬁrst column of Table 4 no further
19 We collapse the measures using principal component analysis, as described in Footnote 11.
13controls are added. The coe cients for parents’ trust attitudes are positive and signiﬁcant
at any conventional level, indicating the presence of a positive intergenerational correla-
tion. As was the case for risk, child attitudes are related to attitudes of both the mother
and the father. An interesting di erence, however, is that the coe cient for mother is
signiﬁcantly larger than the coe cient for father in the case of trust attitudes (p-value
< 0.02), whereas there was no signiﬁcant di erence for risk attitudes (p-value < 0.79). The
coe cients remain basically unchanged and highly signiﬁcant when we add further con-
trols in Columns (2) and (3). In summary, these ﬁndings are consistent with transmission
of priors regarding trustworthiness from parents to children.
An important ﬁnal point regarding trust is that we have so far assumed that willing-
ness to take risks and willingness to trust are distinct attitudes. One may argue, however,
that trusting someone is a risky decision and thus that willingness to trust could partly
reﬂect risk preference. On the other hand, there is no conceptual reason why the belief-
related component of willingness to trust, in the form of a prior about trustworthiness of
others, should be related to risk preference. It is important to know whether the trust
measures capture something distinct from the measures of risk preference, because only if
this is the case we can sensibly talk about an independent correlation for risk and trust.
To study this question we ran the regressions reported in Table 5. In Column (1)
we regress children’s willingness to take risks on parents’ willingness to take risks and
willingness to trust. We also control for the trust attitudes of children and include our
standard controls as in Column (3) of Table 2. The marginal coe cients on mothers’ and
fathers’ willingness to take risks are positive and signiﬁcant and similar in size to those
in Column (3) of Table 2. This shows that the disposition towards trust does not explain
risk attitudes. But what about the relation between trust and risk? In Column (2) we
regress children’s trust jointly on parents’ willingness to take risks and their trust attitudes,
together with the controls as in Column (1). We ﬁnd that the coe cients on mothers’
and fathers’ trust are positive and highly signiﬁcant.20 They are also very similar to those
obtained in the regressions from Table 4, i.e., without controlling for risk attitudes. This
implies that trust attitudes do not simply measure attitudes towards risk and that the
intergenerational correlations in risk and trust attitudes represent two distinct forms of
20 We ﬁnd similar results if we instead use the hypothetical lottery question, or other risk questions, as
the measure of risk preference in the regression.
14attitude transmission.
3.3 Robustness
3.3.1 Collaboration on Survey Responses
A potential concern regarding the results shown in Tables 2 and 4 is that correlations
could be driven by parents and children somehow coordinating on how to answer di erent
questions. While this is potentially a very serious concern we are quite conﬁdent that it
does not explain the ﬁndings. First, interviewers are speciﬁcally instructed to administer
the survey individually, and to make sure that di erent household members answer in-
dependently. If for some reason one household member wants to ﬁll in the paper survey
at the same time that the interviewer conducts a personal interview with another house-
hold member, the interviewer is instructed to ensure that these two survey respondents
are in di erent rooms. Therefore, collaboration is ruled out by design. Second, ﬁlling
out a survey involves answering about 150 question modules. Thus, even if respondents
did have some limited communication during the interview, despite the best e orts of
the interviewer, it is very unlikely that this applies systematically to the small subset of
questions that are the key variables in this study. Third, we have estimated all of the re-
gressions in Tables 2 and 4, excluding from the sample observations of parents-child pairs
if one of the three individuals had sent in the questionnaire answers by surface mail, i.e.,
answered the survey without the interviewer being present. In this case, we ﬁnd a similar
and signiﬁcant intergenerational correlation in risk and trust attitudes. Fourth, we also
estimated the same regressions using the 40 percent of children in the sample who live in a
separate household from their parents. In this case the intergenerational correlation is still
highly signiﬁcant for both mothers and fathers, for both risk and trust (the correlations
for trust are essentially unchanged; for risk the correlations are somewhat smaller but
the combined e ect of both parents is still large). Fifth, the correlations obtained from
using just the sample of children living with their parents yields similar results to using
the whole sample. Finally, we have also restricted the sample to parents-child-pairs who
all participated in CAPI interviews only; this excludes the possibility that questionnaires
were completed simultaneously, because only one person at a time can possibly ﬁll out the
survey on the laptop. Again, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations similar to those in Tables 2
15and 4. These ﬁndings make us conﬁdent that the results are not driven by collaboration
between family members.
3.3.2 Speciﬁcity of the Transmission Process and Scale-Use
Another question concerns the speciﬁcity of the transmitted attitudes: Do parents pass on
a relatively general disposition towards risk-taking or trust to their children, or do children
end up being similar to the parents even in relatively detailed ways? Or do children just
use response scales in a similar way as their parents? To address these issues, we exploit
that parents di er in their willingness to take risks across di erent contexts. For example,
some parents are reluctant to take risks in car driving, but even more so with respect to
ﬁnancial matters. If a general disposition is transmitted, we would predict that the child
is risk averse, but not that this speciﬁc di erence across contexts is reproduced in the next
generation. On the other hand, if these same di erences are observed in the child, this is
di cult to explain with scale use, given that all of the context-speciﬁc measures involve
exactly the same 11-point scale.
In Columns (1) to (6) of Table 6 we regress children’s answers to a given risk question
on parents’ responses to all of the risk questions simultaneously. We also control for
children’s answers to all context-speciﬁc risk questions. Table 6 reveals that the respective
estimated coe cients, which are found along the diagonal of the table, are all positive
and highly signiﬁcant. Thus, controlling for risk attitudes in all other contexts, children’s
in a given context are strongly and signiﬁcantly associated with those of their parents in
that same context. Moreover, most other coe cients o  the diagonal are not signiﬁcant;
if they are signiﬁcant, they are typically substantially smaller than those on the diagonal.
Thus, parents’ attitudes in a given context are the best predictor of a child’s attitudes in
that same context.21
In Table 7 we perform the same exercise as in Table 4, but use answers to three trust
questions separately instead of the principal component. As with risk attitudes, within-
parent di erences in responses to the di erent contexts are observed in the child, holding
the response scale constant. These results suggest that children are not just similar to
their parents in terms of a general disposition towards risk-taking or trust, but are similar
21 Note that context-speciﬁc measures tend to be correlated for an individual (ranging from 0.26 to 0.45),
making the diagonal result all the more striking.
16in an even more precise sense.
This detailed analysis of the intergenerational correlation in context-speciﬁc mea-
sures of risk attitudes, and context-speciﬁc individual trust measures reveals that the
transmission process is fairly speciﬁc, and sheds doubt on the hypothesis that similar
scale-use might drive the previous ﬁndings concerning an intergenerational correlation in
attitudes. The fact that we observe a strong correlation in economic attitudes, across
various survey measures for risk and trust, with di erent response scales, provides an-
other indication that the results are not explained simply by patterns of scale-use being
shared by parents and children. As an additional robustness check, however, we investi-
gated the intergenerational correlation in risk attitudes excluding families who exhibit a
particularly salient heuristic for scale use, namely choosing the midpoint of the scale. We
actually found a stronger intergenerational correlation in risk attitudes after eliminating
child-parents pairs where the child and both parents make identical choices by choosing 5
on the scale. This indicates that the results are not driven by a similar tendency within
families to choose the mid-point of response scales.
3.3.3 Reverse Causality
Some of the ﬁndings already suggest that the intergenerational correlation in attitudes is
unlikely to be explained by reverse causality from the child to the parents. For example,
parental attitudes in contexts such as career strongly predict child attitudes in the same
context, even controlling for attitudes in other contexts. Given that parental career is often
largely determined by the time a child is born, due to a whole sequence of educational
and other choices, the intergenerational correlation in this context is unlikely to be driven
by reverse causality. We also show below that child attitudes are related to the prevailing
attitude in the region. It is clearly not plausible that child attitudes inﬂuence the average
attitude in the region, whereas socialization of the child by parents and other role models
can explain both results. One way to investigate the issue of causality further, however,
is to use an instrumental variable approach, which is what we pursue in this section.
Previous research has used cultural characteristics, such as religion, as instruments
for attitudes such as trust. Historically, di erent religions have been associated with di er-
ent economically relevant attitudes, most famously Protestantism and attitudes towards
work as discussed by Weber (1930). More recently, Guiso et al. (2003) use the World
17Values Survey and ﬁnd signiﬁcant di erences in trust by religion. McCleary and Barro
(2006) pursue a similar approach, although they ﬁnd less evidence that religious belief
(belief in hell) is related to trust. In Table 1 we saw that religion a ects risk attitudes of
children. Performing the same type of regressions for mothers and fathers we also ﬁnd a
similar impact of religion, although the e ect is stronger for mothers.22 As is the case for
children, religion has little impact on mothers’ and fathers’ trust, indicating that religion
may work less well as an instrument for trust in our data. Other parental characteristics
are also related to parental risk and trust attitudes, including years of education, and
characteristics of the region of residence during youth, and are potential instruments by
virtue of being plausibly exogenous with respect to child attitudes.
In Table 8 we instrument for parents’ attitudes, and control for child religion, region
of youth, and years of education, to rule out that the instruments a ect child attitudes
solely through a correlation with these child characteristics. In Columns (1) to (3) we ﬁnd
a strong positive relationship between child risk attitudes and mother’s and father’s instru-
mented attitudes, respectively, except in Column (3) where father is no longer signiﬁcant.
The latter result could indicate that for fathers previous results were biased upwards, but
it seems more likely that the IV estimates for fathers su er more from problems of weak
instruments. Indeed, in the ﬁrst stage for Column (3) the F-test for mothers is around
6, whereas for fathers it is only about 4.23 In Columns (4) to (6) of Table 8 coe cients
for mothers’ and fathers’ instrumented trust attitudes are positive and large, but only
mother’s trust is signiﬁcant. Again, ﬁrst stage F-tests are relatively low, particularly in
Column (6). Overall, the results reinforce the case against reverse causality as the main
explanation for the intergenerational correlations, but given that the instruments are not
particularly strong, we take the IV estimates as additional, suggestive evidence.
4 Assortative mating of parents
We now turn to the second mechanism discussed in the literature, positive assortative
mating. Notably, the previous results are consistent with both mothers and fathers in-
ﬂuencing the child, which is a prerequisite for assortative mating to be relevant for child
attitudes.
22 Results available upon request.
23 We ﬁnd qualitatively similar results instrumenting using only parental religion.
18A priori, the prediction of whether assortative mating should be positive or negative
depends on whether these are substitutes or complements in the production of joint utility
for the couple (Lam, 1988). For example, to the extent that there are gains to specialization
in production, and these di erent tasks are better suited for di erent risk attitudes, it
could be optimal to have one member of the couple who is risk-seeking and another
who is risk averse.24 On the other hand, given that we ﬁnd that both parents inﬂuence
child attitudes, attitude transmission models predict positive assortative mating, because
parents who have a preference for children with attitudes similar to their own have an
incentive to seek out partners with similar risk and trust attitudes.
Panel A of Table 9 presents estimation results for the correlation of risk attitudes
among couples. In Columns (1), (2) and (3), the sample includes all cohabiting married
and non-married couples for whom we have non-missing values on risk attitudes and other
relevant regressors; the sample in Columns (4), (5) and (6) only includes parents for whom
the child’s risk attitude is observed, that is, for parents in the sample analyzed in Section
3.1. The dependent variable is the willingness of the female spouse (partner) to take
risks on the 11-point scale. The results show a strong and positive relationship of female
spouse’s risk attitudes with the risk attitudes of the male spouse.
The e ect remains positive and signiﬁcant when controlling for exogenous and other
controls in Columns (2) and (3) or (5) and (6), respectively. The usual e ects of age and
height on risk attitudes remain signiﬁcant. Evidence of positive assortative mating on risk
attitudes is not conﬁned to the question about risk taking in general. We ﬁnd a similarly
signiﬁcant and positive correlation if we use any of the ﬁve context-speciﬁc risk questions
to measure female and male spouse’s risk attitudes, and run regressions with the same
speciﬁcations as in Table 9.25 Using female spouse’s responses to the hypothetical lottery
question as the dependent variable, we also ﬁnd a strong positive relationship, such that
if the male spouse invests 1,000 Euros more, the female spouse invests an additional 300
Euros.
Panel B of Table 9 investigates whether there is signiﬁcant correlation between
couples in terms of trust, and whether the correlation is positive as in the case of risk
24 Chiappori and Reny (2006) develop a theoretical model in which negative assortative mating arises in
equilibrium, because couples face income risk and it is optimal to have one safe and one risky income
in the household portfolio.
25 Results are available upon request.
19attitudes. For our usual speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between the
trust principal component of the female spouse and the trust principal component of the
male spouse,indicating the presence of positive assortative mating along the dimension of
trust.
To check whether endogeneity of female spouse’s attitudes could bias the estimated
correlation, we investigated the within-couple correlation in attitudes, instrumenting for
one spouses’ attitudes by the attitudes of the spouse’s parents (mother and father). The
relevant sample is thus all couples for whom we observe attitudes of at least one spouse’s
parents. The dependent variable is the attitude of the spouse for whom we do not ob-
serve parental attitudes, regressed on the instrumented attitude of the other spouse. The
maintained assumption is that parental attitudes are exogenous to the attitudes of the
child’s spouse, other than through the channel of the child’s attitudes (and potentially
other child characteristics, but these are included as controls). In this case ﬁrst stage
F-tests are typically well above 10, and the IV estimate of the correlation between couples
is almost twice as large, for both risk and trust attitudes. This suggests that if anything
the coe cients on spouse’s attitudes in Table 9 may be biased downwards.
As another robustness check, we assess whether there is a signiﬁcant correlation even
for couples who have only been married a relatively short time. If so, this helps to rule
out the possibility that people who get married subsequently develop similar attitudes,
as opposed to the hypothesis of positive assortative mating in which the similarity in
attitudes causes people to get married. Using the same speciﬁcation as in the Columns
(2) and (5) of Table 9, we restrict the sample to couples who got married during the current
or previous year, and estimate the within-couple correlation. We ﬁnd that the correlation
is still signiﬁcant and positive, and almost as large as for the full sample of couples: the
coe cient on male spouse’s risk attitudes is 0.24 and the coe cient for trust attitudes
is 0.34, both signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. These ﬁndings are again supportive
of the second, reinforcing mechanism for attitude transmission, working through positive
assortative mating.
205 The Impact of Regional Risk and Trust Attitudes
So far we have shown that parental attitudes have a substantial impact on child attitudes,
reinforced by positive assortative mating. This does not rule out, however, that other
individuals in the environment inﬂuence the child as well. Theories of attitude formation
typically assume that child attitudes may be a ected by other local role models, in addition
to parents.
Table 10 investigates whether prevailing attitudes in a child’s region of residence
have explanatory power for child attitudes. The table reports results using the speciﬁ-
cation from Column (2) of Tables 2 and 4, but adding controls for average attitudes in
the region. The average is calculated using all participants in the SOEP data set with
non-missing attitudes, in order to obtain the best estimate. The sample used to calculate
the average is substantially larger than the one used for the regression analysis, because it
includes individuals for whom we do not observe parents. We exclude the child’s attitude
when calculating the regional average. Columns (1) and (3) report the results from Tables
2 and 4, for ease of comparison, and Columns (2) and (4) show results for risk and trust,
respectively, once we control for regional attitudes. The coe cients for regional attitudes
are positive and highly signiﬁcant in Columns (2) and (4), controlling for parental atti-
tudes. This indicates that child attitudes are inﬂuenced by attitudes in the environment,
controlling for parental attitudes.
To check whether the results in Table 10 could reﬂect sorting of children into regions
with similar attitudes to their own, we estimated the same regressions using only the
sample of children who currently live with their parents and thus presumably did not
choose their region of residence. Parents might sort into regions based on attitudes, but
we control for parental attitudes in the regression. In this case we again ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant impaction of regional attitudes on the child, for both risk and trust attitudes,
which is only slightly smaller than when we used the whole sample, indicating that sorting
does not explain the result.26 Thus, we conclude that the evidence is consistent with
26 Detailed results are available upon request. We also also check robustness to eliminating the small
fraction of children who are living with very old parents (parents age 70 and up), and alternatively to
eliminating children who live with their parents and are relatively old themselves (children age 40 and
up), because in these situations it could be the case that the child chose the region, and parents moved
in with the child due to old-age-related inﬁrmity. Results are very similar when these cases are excluded,
for both risk and trust.
21prevailing attitudes in the local area inﬂuencing child attitudes, controlling for parental
attitudes.
An important ﬁnal point is that a role for regional attitudes in inﬂuencing the child
does not conﬂict with the previous conclusion that parents matter for child attitudes. Note
that in Table 10 the coe cients on parental attitudes are essentially unchanged when we
control for regional attitudes, compared to Columns (1) and (3). This is consistent with our
previous results showing that including regional ﬁxed e ects does not a ect the relationship
between parental and child attitudes. We also pursued another approach to investigating
whether the correlation between parent and child attitudes could be spurious, and driven
by similarity in region characteristics. We randomly re-match parents and children with
members of other families living in the same region, and test whether the correlation in
these synthetic families is similar to the correlation observed within real families. If this
were the case, this would suggest that the driver of similar attitudes within families is
the fact that they often share the same region of residence. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure
3 present histograms of the correlations of risk attitudes between child and mother, and
child and father, respectively, in 500 samples where parents are randomly drawn among
the population of the same region.27 The vertical bars indicate the correlation that results
from the true mothers and fathers, respectively. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3 present
similar histograms for trust. The ﬁgures illustrate that in all cases the hypothesis that
regional a liation drives the positive correlation in attitudes between child and parents is
strongly rejected. On the other hand, the correlations obtained with randomly assigned
parents rather than true parents are always positive, consistent with our results above
showing an independent role for regions in inﬂuencing child attitudes.
6 Concluding Remarks
By assuming that economically relevant attitudes are transmitted across generations, new
theories have been able to rationalize a wide range of important behaviors and outcomes.
A key element of these new explanations, however, has been unobserved, namely the pro-
cess of attitude transmission itself. This paper provides empirical evidence on attitude
transmission, thereby testing a key set of assumptions behind a large literature. We test
27 The sample only includes child-parent pairs that live within the same region.
22three di erent channels for attitude transmission emphasized in the literature: (1) trans-
mission of attitudes from parents to children; (2) positive assortative mating of parents,
which tends to reinforce the impact of parents on the child; (3) an inﬂuence of other
role models in the environment on child attitudes, in addition to parents. Testing all
three mechanisms in the same data, using the same empirical strategy, is important for
comparing and disentangling their respective roles. The ﬁndings indicate that all three
mechanisms play a role in shaping individual attitudes. This provides an empirical un-
derpinning for the attitude transmission approach, and helps open the black box of where
fundamental economic attitudes come from.
In this paper, we document a robust intergenerational correlation in risk and trust
attitudes and establish that children end up having similar attitudes towards risk and trust
as their parents. An intriguing question one might ask given these results is which mecha-
nism or combination of mechanisms is most important in the transmission process. There
are at least three potential transmission channels: genetics, child learning by imitation,
and deliberate e orts by parents to shape the preferences and beliefs of their children. In
this paper, we have been hesitant to address this question mainly because we believe that
our data are not well-suited for generating compelling new evidence. Using twin data,
recent work by Cesarini et al. (2007, 2008) provides evidence for the relevance of genetics
in the transmission of responder behavior in ultimatum games, and cooperation in the
trust game, respectively. At the same time, our evidence on family structure and envi-
ronment suggests that alternative transmission channels are also important. Moreover,
genetic and social inﬂuences may act in concert, and possibly interact.28 One should note,
however, that establishing empirical evidence for attitude transmission from parents to
children, and for assortative mating, on basis of a large sample is important regardless of
the precise transmission mechanism, because of the relevance for economic theories and the
far reaching implications for understanding, e.g., social mobility or persistence of cultural
di erences.
Evidence of attitude transmission is relevant for other literatures as well. A large
body of evidence has shown strong persistence in economic outcomes, such as income,
education, and asset holdings across generations (for a recent survey see Bj¨ orklund, 2007).
28 That is to say, the impact of genetics and environment may not simply be additive. For a discussion
see Bouchard and Loehlin (2001).
23Typically, however, empirical studies in this literature remain silent about the particular
economic channel through which parental outcomes causally a ect children’s outcomes,
and without doubt, many factors may play a role at the micro level and explain the causal
e ects of parental outcomes for children’s outcomes, such as, e.g., direct transfers of re-
sources. The transmission of attitudes provides an additional mechanism for explaining
persistent di erences in outcomes: children may end up with similar outcomes to the
parents partly because they have similar attitudes and thus make the same patterns of
choices in life. Hence, the evidence presented in this paper helps shedding new light on
intergenerational outcome transmission. The construction and estimation of structural
models in order to investigate the relative importance of attitude transmission and alter-
native channels in explaining intergenerational mobility constitutes an interesting topic
for future research.
Another application of our ﬁndings is to the literature on assortative mating, where
there is evidence of correlated behaviors between married individuals, for example in terms
of smoking or educational choice (see, e.g., Fern´ andez et al., 2005). Positive assortative
mating on the basis of fundamental attitudes is one relevant underlying mechanism for
explaining why couples exhibit similar behaviors. The ﬁnding that regional attitudes a ect
child attitudes is also relevant for literatures on social interaction and neighborhood e ects.
Speciﬁcally, regional contagion of risk preference and trust provide evidence for two of the
three channels for social interaction e ects hypothesized by Manski (2000), namely social
interaction e ects working through the channel of preferences and through the channel of
expectations. These mechanisms can in turn help explain evidence of neighborhood e ects.
For example, regional attitude transmission helps explain the ﬁnding that similarity in
various economic behaviors is reinforced for ethnic groups that tend to cluster in the same
geographic area (Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2005), and the ﬁnding that an individual’s trust is
related to trust in the country of ancestry (Guiso et al., 2006). Transmission of attitudes,
particularly regarding risk, is also potentially relevant for explaining correlations between
adolescents’ risky behaviors (e.g., drug use and crime), and behaviors of other role models
in the local environment (see, e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1996; Kling et al.,
2007).
We have focused on transmission of risk attitudes and trust partly because these are
particularly relevant for economic behavior. Indeed, previous evidence shows that individ-
24ual di erences in the particular measures that we use translate into important di erences
in behavior and outcomes. An important direction for future research, however, is inves-
tigating the three-fold channels for transmission of other economically relevant attitudes.
For example, impatience is a prime candidate, as recent theoretical work hypothesizes
that parents deliberately invest in a particular discount rate for the child (Doepke and
Zilibotti, 2005 and 2008). Another candidate is reciprocity, the tendency to respond in-
kind to hostile or kind actions by others. Like trust, reciprocal inclinations are a crucial
determinant of how someone behaves in conditions of contractual incompleteness, except
that they are relevant for the behavior of a second-mover, deciding how to respond to kind
or unkind behavior. Transmission of reciprocity would be important, because the degree
of reciprocity in a society is a crucial component of social capital, in particular for the
informal enforcement of norms (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000 and Bowles and Gintis, 2000b).
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Principal component trust measure
Father’s trust attitudes
Notes: The upper histograms in the ﬁgure show the distributions of responses to the question about
general risk attitudes for mothers (left histogram) and fathers (right histogram). The bottom histograms
in the ﬁgure show the distributions of the trust principal component, which combines the information
from three separate survey measures of trust, for mothers (left histogram) and fathers (right histogram).
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Child’s trust attitude (mean) Weighted regression line
Notes: The upper graphs in the ﬁgure show children’s average self-reported willingness to take risks for a
given willingness to take risks of mothers (left diagram) and fathers (right diagram). The bottom graphs
in the ﬁgure show children’s average principal component “trust” for a given principal component “trust”
of mothers (left diagram) and fathers (right diagram).
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(d) Correlation Random Father-Child: Trust
Notes: The upper diagrams in the ﬁgure show the distribution of correlation coe cients of willingness to
take risks between children and randomly matched adults. The correlation coe cients are obtained from
500 iterations where each involves randomly matching a child to a parent who lives in the same region as
the child’s actual parent. The vertical line indicates the correlation coe cient for the risk attitudes of
children and their actual parents, observe in the SOEP data. The bottom diagrams in the ﬁgure show
similar results for the correlation in the principal component “trust”, again based on 500 iterations of
random matching within regions. The vertical line indicates the correlation coe cient for the principal
component “trust” of children and their actual parents as observed in the SOEP. Note that child-parents
pairs who do not currently live in the same region are excluded.
32Tables
33Table 1: The Relationship between Attitudes and Personal Characteristics
Dependent variable: Willingness to take risks Trust (principal component)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if female -0.197*** -0.204*** 0.043 0
[0.048] [0.048] [0.051] [0.051]
Age of respondent (years) -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.006** -0.009***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Height of respondent (cm) 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.006**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Years of education 0.002 0.009**
[0.004] [0.004]
Years of Education Missing -0.055 -0.034
[0.085] [0.067]
1 if grew up in big city 0.111* 0.192***
[0.057] [0.060]
1 if grew up in city -0.006 -0.095
[0.057] [0.058]
1 if grew up in the countryside 0.058 -0.027
[0.050] [0.053]
1 if information on childhood 0.055 -0.017
residence missing [0.064] [0.066]
1 if respondent catholic 0.232** 0.026
[0.114] [0.126]
1 if respondent protestant 0.220* 0.093
[0.114] [0.125]
1 if respondent other religion 0.151 -0.135
[0.143] [0.145]
1 if no religious a liation 0.296*** -0.163
[0.114] [0.126]
1 if missing information for 0.201 -0.053
respondent’s religion [0.123] [0.288]
Constant -1.390*** -1.551*** -1.259** -0.925*
[0.496] [0.519] [0.503] [0.515]
Observations 3327 3327 3280 3280
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03
The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) measures general willingness to take risks on an
eleven-point scale from zero (completely unwilling to take risks) to ten (completely willing to take
risks). The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the principal component constructed
from an individual’s level of agreement with three statements regarding trust (general trust,
reliance in others, need for caution in dealing with strangers). To ease comparison of coe cients,
dependent variables in all columns are standardized. Reference categories are other Christian
denomination, and grew up in small town, for religion and characteristics of region of youth,
respectively. Coe cients in all columns are OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets
allow for clustering at the household level; ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-
percent level, respectively. All religion information is obtained from the 2003 wave of the SOEP.
Reference groups are protestant and grew up in a small town.
34Table 2: The Relationship between Children’s and Parents’ Risk Attitudes
Dependent variable: Child’s willingness to take risks in general
(1) (2) (3)
Mother’s willingness to take risks in general 0.165*** 0.153*** 0.148***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.022]
Father’s willingness to take risks in general 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.154***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.023]
1 if female -0.228*** -0.214***
[0.051] [0.055]
Age of Child (years) -0.017*** -0.019***
[0.004] [0.005]
Height of Child (cm) 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.003] [0.003]
Age of mother (years) 0.010** 0.014**
[0.005] [0.006]
Age of father (years) -0.007 -0.012**
[0.004] [0.005]
Height of mother (cm) -0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.004]
Height of father (cm) -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0 -0.487 -1.860**
[0.017] [0.617] [0.942]
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 3,331 3,327 2,980
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.21
The dependent variable in Columns (1), (2) and (3) measures general willingness to take risks
on an eleven-point scale from zero (completely unwilling to take risks) to ten (completely
willing to take risks), and is standardized. Explanatory risk variables are also measured
on the eleven-point scale, and are also standardized. Coe cients in all columns are OLS
estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level;
***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Additional
controls include: years of schooling of child and child’s father and mother; corresponding
indicator variables for missing schooling information; indicator variables for characteristics
of the residence of youth before age of 16, for child and parents (big city, city, countryside,
missing; the reference category is small town); indicator variables for religion of child and
parents (catholic, protestant, other non-Christian, no religious a liation, missing religion;
the reference category is other Christian), gross annual household income for child, child’s
mother and father, subjective health status of child, and child’s mother and father (ﬁve
response categories), and ﬁxed e ects for region (Raumordnungsregion) and 17 nationality-
ethnicity dummies (reference category is German). All religion information is obtained from

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4: The Relationship between Children’s and Parents’ Trust
Dependent variable: Child’s trust (principal component)
(1) (2) (3)
Trust: Mother 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.205***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024]
Trust: Father 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.141***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024]
1 if female 0.013 -0.035
[0.052] [0.059]
Age of Child (years) -0.013*** -0.009*
[0.004] [0.005]
Height of Child (cm) 0.004 0.001
[0.003] [0.003]
Age of mother (years) 0.008 0.011*
[0.005] [0.006]
Age of father (years) 0.004 0
[0.005] [0.006]
Height of mother (cm) -0.001 -0.003
[0.003] [0.004]
Height of father (cm) 0.003 0
[0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0 -1.374** 0.091
[0.017] [0.634] [0.798]
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 3,327 3,276 2,626
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.26
The trust variables measure trust as the principal component obtained from agree-
ment with three statements regarding trust (general trust, reliance on others, need
for caution in dealing with strangers) measured on a four-point scale. The mea-
sures are standardized. Coe cients in all columns are OLS estimates. Robust
standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***, **,
* indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Additional
controls include: years of schooling of child and child’s father and mother; corre-
sponding indicator variables for missing schooling information; indicator variables
for characteristics of the residence of youth before age of 16, for child and parents
(big city, city, small town, countryside, missing); indicator variables for religion of
child and parents (catholic, protestant, other non-Christian, no religion, missing
religion; the reference category is other Christian). All religion information is
obtained from the 2003 wave of the SOEP.
37Table 5: Distinguishing the Correlation in Trust from the Correlation in Risk Attitudes
Dependent variable:
Child’s willingness to Child’s trust
take risks principal component
(1) (2)
Mother’s willingness to take risks in general 0.138*** -0.014
[0.024] [0.022]
Father’s willingness to take risks in general 0.173*** -0.035
[0.025] [0.023]
Trust: Mother -0.068*** 0.208***
[0.025] [0.024]
Trust: Father -0.027 0.145***
[0.025] [0.024]




1 if female -0.249*** -0.014
[0.060] [0.060]
Age of child (years) -0.016*** -0.008
[0.005] [0.005]
Height of child (cm) 0.007** 0.001
[0.004] [0.003]
Age of mother (years) 0.014** 0.01
[0.006] [0.006]
Age of father (years) -0.014** 0
[0.006] [0.006]
Height of mother (cm) -0.002 -0.004
[0.004] [0.004]




Additional controls Yes Yes
Observations 2,607 2,607
R-squared 0.22 0.26
The dependent variable in Column (1) measures general willingness to take risk on an eleven-
point scale from zero (completely unwilling to take risks) to ten (completely willing to take
risks), and is standardized. Explanatory risk variables are measured on the eleven-point scale
and standardized as well. The trust variables measure trust as the standardized principal
component obtained from agreement with three statements regarding trust (general trust,
reliance on others, need for caution in dealing with strangers) measured on a four-point scale.
Coe cients in all columns are OLS estimates. Additional controls include: years of schooling
of Child and Child’s father and mother; corresponding indicator variables for missing schooling
information; indicator variables for characteristics of the residence of youth before age of 16,
for child and parents (big city, city, countryside, missing; the reference category is small
town); indicator variables for religion of child and parents (catholic, protestant, other non-
Christian, no religious a liation, missing religion; the reference category is other Christian),
gross annual household income for Child, Child’s mother and father, subjective health status
of Child, and Child’s mother and father (ﬁve response categories), and ﬁxed e ects for region
(Raumordnungsregion) and 17 nationality-ethnicity dummies (reference category is German).
All religion information is obtained from the 2003 wave of the SOEP.
38Table 6: Speciﬁcity of the Intergenerational Correlation in Risk Attitudes
Dependent variable: Child’s willingness to take risks in the context of:
General Car Financial Sports & Career Health
driving matters leisure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Willingness to take risks in the context of:
General: Mother 0.087*** -0.022 -0.015 0.019 0.026 -0.041
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025]
General: Father 0.084*** -0.028 -0.053* -0.014 0.018 -0.014
[0.025] [0.027] [0.029] [0.025] [0.026] [0.028]
Driving: Mother -0.047** 0.114*** 0.012 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016
[0.023] [0.026] [0.025] [0.022] [0.024] [0.025]
Driving: Father 0.006 0.098*** -0.019 0.006 -0.006 -0.022
[0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
Financial: Mother 0.018 -0.046* 0.115*** -0.016 -0.04 -0.004
[0.023] [0.026] [0.027] [0.022] [0.025] [0.026]
Financial: Father -0.024 0.025 0.089*** 0.036 -0.029 -0.037
[0.024] [0.027] [0.025] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026]
Sports: Mother -0.02 0.006 -0.059** 0.111*** -0.031 0.012
[0.025] [0.030] [0.028] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027]
Sports: Father -0.022 -0.04 0.031 0.091*** 0.02 -0.021
[0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027]
Career: Mother 0.003 -0.001 -0.017 0.02 0.080*** -0.022
[0.026] [0.030] [0.030] [0.026] [0.028] [0.029]
Career: Father -0.02 0 0.053* -0.032 0.084*** -0.015
[0.026] [0.027] [0.028] [0.025] [0.028] [0.029]
Health: Mother 0.018 -0.027 -0.016 -0.044** 0.015 0.103***
[0.023] [0.026] [0.028] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026]
Health: Father -0.036 -0.008 -0.039 -0.035* -0.044* 0.145***
[0.022] [0.024] [0.025] [0.021] [0.024] [0.025]
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,308
R-squared 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.57 0.53 0.47
The dependent variable in each column measures willingness to take risk in the particular context on an eleven-point
scale from zero (completely unwilling to take risks) to ten (completely willing to take risks), and is standardized.
Explanatory risk variables are coded on the eleven-point scale and standardized as well. Coe cients in all columns
are OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for correlation of errors at the household level; ***, **,
* indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Additional controls include: years of schooling of
Child and Child’s father and mother; corresponding indicator variables for missing schooling information; indicator
variables for characteristics of the residence of youth before age of 16, for child and parents (big city, city, countryside,
missing; the reference category is small town); indicator variables for religion of child and parents (catholic, protes-
tant, other non-Christian, no religious a liation, missing religion; the reference category is other Christian), gross
annual household income for Child, Child’s mother and father, subjective health status of Child, and Child’s mother
and father (ﬁve response categories), and ﬁxed e ects for region (Raumordnungsregion) and 17 nationality-ethnicity
dummies (reference category is German). All religion information is obtained from the 2003 wave of the SOEP. A
substantial fraction, roughly 1/4, of the sample do not have complete answers to risk questions in all contexts due
to item non-response, in particular when the question does not apply (e.g., car driving for 17 year old individuals).
39Table 7: Speciﬁcity of the Intergenerational Correlation in Trust
Dependent variable is Child’s General trust Reliability Need for caution
(1) (2) (3)
Trust: Mother 0.155*** 0.051** -0.015
[0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
Trust: Father 0.098*** 0.040* 0.046*
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025]
Reliability: Mother 0.038* 0.124*** 0.039
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
Reliability: Father 0.038 0.151*** 0.03
[0.025] [0.026] [0.025]
Caution: Mother 0.043** -0.012 0.159***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024]
Caution: Father 0.011 -0.014 0.068***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.023]
Trust: Child -0.428*** -0.133***
[0.022] [0.023]
Reliability: Child -0.436*** 0.172***
[0.022] [0.023]
Caution: Child -0.114*** 0.144***
[0.020] [0.020]
1 if female 0.031 0.004 -0.01
[0.054] [0.053] [0.054]
Age of child (years) 0.002 -0.009* 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Height of child (cm) 0 -0.003 0.005*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Age of mother (years) 0.005 0.016*** -0.002
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Age of father (years) -0.004 -0.008 0.006
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Height of mother (cm) 0.006* 0.002 0
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Height of father (cm) -0.001 0.002 -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Constant -1.668** -0.744 -1.438*
[0.714] [0.693] [0.740]
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,626 2,626 2,626
R-squared 0.39 0.4 0.28
The measures for general trust, reliability and need for caution reﬂect agreement or disagree-
ment with corresponding statements on a four-point scale. The statements are “In general,
one can trust people.”, “In these days you cannot rely on anybody else.”, and “When dealing
with strangers it is better to be cautious when dealing with them.”, respectively. Answers
are reported on a four-category scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. All
dependent and explanatory variables are standardized. Coe cients in all columns are OLS
estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***,
**, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Additional controls
include: years of schooling of child and child’s father and mother; corresponding indicator
variables for missing schooling information; indicator variables for characteristics of the res-
idence of youth before age of 16, for child and parents (big city, city, countryside, missing;
the reference category is small town); indicator variables for religion of child and parents
(catholic, protestant, other non-Christian, no religious a liation, missing religion; the ref-
erence category is other Christian), gross annual household income for child, child’s mother
and father, subjective health status of Child, and Child’s mother and father (ﬁve response
categories), and ﬁxed e ects for region (Raumordnungsregion) and 17 nationality-ethnicity
dummies (reference category is German). All religion information is obtained from the 2003
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